By Donald J. Lisio
In the course of international battle I, British naval supremacy enabled it to impose monetary blockades and interdiction of yank impartial transport. the U.S. replied by way of development "a army moment to none," one so robust that groovy Britain couldn't back effectively problem America's very important fiscal pursuits. This publication unearths that after the U.S. provided to replacement naval equality for its rising naval supremacy, the British, still, used the ensuing significant foreign arms-control meetings of the Twenties to make sure its endured naval dominance.
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Additional resources for British Naval Supremacy and Anglo-American Antagonisms, 1914-1930
As Great Britain was by right entitled to a larger navy than any other power, the Admiralty emphatically insisted that the “main object” of any international arms control conference was merely “to reduce the expenditure . . on armaments” rather than to achieve either equality or limitations on the ability or the methods of making war – a position which the Admiralty would maintain in 1927 at the second naval arms-control conference in Geneva. 23 The Admiralty strategy at the 1921–1922 Washington Naval Conference was, in fact, carefully crafted to retain British naval superiority and to shift any blame for failure on to other powers.
65–70. ; Sprout, New Order, pp. 162–164; Davis, Navy Second to None, p. 292; Bywater, Navies and Nations, p. 136; Roskill, Naval Policy, 1919–1929, pp. 312–313. ” Yet, for the moment, he strove to present an understated, sanguine posture. Since one of the cardinal goals of British diplomacy was the drastic reduction of America’s naval strength, Balfour could not afford to antagonize Hughes with England’s hidden goal of 40 additional auxiliary cruisers and 120 destroyers. e. six less than now” in the entire British ﬂeet.
9; Bywater, Navies and Nations, p. 49. The Washington Conference Legacy 31 Five Power Treaty – American naval strategists lamented that both the Japanese and the British had won signiﬁcant military advantages. These military successes, they believed, were compounded by the popular American perception that treaty guarantees were important safeguards against a second world war, thus making a “navy second to none” an expensive waste of the taxpayers’ money. None of the participating naval advisers were completely satisﬁed with the treaties, but it was clear that, unlike the Americans, the Japanese and British naval advisers had been much more successful in using this new experiment in diplomacy to win signiﬁcant military advantages.