Francois Recanati's Direct reference : from language to thought PDF

By Francois Recanati

During this ebook Professor Recanati units out to guard and systematize the much-discussed 'theory of Direct Reference', in response to which the contribution made by way of a referential time period (e.g. a formal identify or demonstrative) to the proposition expressed by means of the sentence the place it happens is its reference. to house the objections commonly levelled opposed to the idea he places ahead a common account of de re thoughts Read more...

summary: during this publication Professor Recanati units out to safeguard and systematize the much-discussed 'theory of Direct Reference', in keeping with which the contribution made by means of a referential time period (e.g. a formal identify or demonstrative) to the proposition expressed via the sentence the place it happens is its reference. to accommodate the objections normally levelled opposed to the idea he places ahead a basic account of de re concepts and their verbal exchange which blends insights from either the Fregean and the Russellian traditions. within the moment a part of the e-book fresh advances in pragmatics are offered and used to make clear the referential/attributive contrast (with admire to either certain descriptions and indexicals) and trust reviews. New remedies of a few of the key issues within the philosophy of brain and language are provided alongside the way in which

Show description

Read Online or Download Direct reference : from language to thought PDF

Best history & surveys books

New PDF release: Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites

Was once Jung's interpretation and review of Nietzsche exact? Nietzsche and Jung considers the idea and personalities of 2 icons of 20th century philosophical and mental proposal, and divulges the intense connections among them. via an intensive exam in their paintings, Nietzsche and Jung succeeds in illuminating complicated parts of Nietzsche's inspiration and resolving ambiguities in Jung's reception of those theories.

Get Direct reference : from language to thought PDF

During this e-book Professor Recanati units out to shield and systematize the much-discussed 'theory of Direct Reference', in keeping with which the contribution made by means of a referential time period (e. g. a formal identify or demonstrative) to the proposition expressed by means of the sentence the place it happens is its reference. to accommodate the objections ordinarily levelled opposed to the speculation he places ahead a basic account of de re recommendations and their conversation which blends insights from either the Fregean and the Russellian traditions.

Additional info for Direct reference : from language to thought

Sample text

This, I will try to show, is entirely a matter of context, of utterance meaning as opposed to sentence meaning: no feature REF is involved at the level of sentence meaning to impose the referential reading of the descrip­ tion. In other words, descriptions can only be 'token-referential', whereas proper names and demonstrative expressions are 'type­ referential' . This is where the difference between REF and DTHAT comes out : for there is nothing to prevent a referential token of a description "the F" from being represented as "DTHAT (the F)" in Kaplanese.

In any theory of Direct Reference, the proposition expressed must be Direct reference and linguistic meaning 18 19 25 carefully distinguished from the object of the attitudes - here called the thought. 4 . ) There are, for example, two modes of presentation associated with the pronoun 'I': from a linguistic point of view, the reference is presented as 'the speaker' (or something like that) , but the concept that is relevant to the thought being expressed is the concept of 'self' (or something like that).

A distinction must be made between (i) directly referential terms (or, more simply, referential terms), which contribute to the proposition expressed - to what is said - merely by picking out a certain object, and (ii) non-connotative terms, which have no meaning besides their reference and do not imply any attribute as belonging to the latter. (i) and (ii) would come to the same thing if there were no difference between the linguistic meaning of an utterance and its propositional content. But such a difference exists: there is a difference, for ex­ ample, between the meaning of the sentence 'I am French' and what is said by an utterance of this sentence (the proposition expressed).

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.39 of 5 – based on 8 votes